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THE MEANING OF J. I. CASE CO. V. BORAK -
REMEDIES AVAILABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF PROXY RULES
UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT*
by
Alex Elson**
T HE FULL significance of J.I. Case v. Boraki was anticipated by Judge
Henry J. Friendly of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
his penetrating and scholarly Benjamin Cardozo lecture.! The thrust of this
lecture was that the Erie decision,' by uprooting the spurious uniformity
of Swift v. Tyson4 and insisting that federal courts defer to the states on
matters outside the states' grant of power to the nation, cleared the way for
a truly uniform federal common law on issues of national concern that
has developed fruitfully and will continue to grow. His prime illustration
of the development of federal common law by the United States Supreme
Court was the Lincoln Mills doctrine'-that Congress, by granting jurisdic-
tion to the federal courts over suits "for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce .... or between any such labor organization, ' gave
a mandate to federal judges to fashion a body of contract law consistent
with the policy of federal labor statutes and binding on all courts. Judge
Friendly foresaw the development of federal common law of corporate
responsibility already under way in decisions by the federal courts "imply-
ing causes of action from and filling interstices in laws administered by
the SEC."' His lecture was delivered after the Seventh Circuit decision in
Borak,8 but before it was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Referring to
Borak, he stated that holdings of this character would become "of even
greater importance if Congress adopts the proposal of the SEC to make
various sections of the Securities and Exchange Act applicable to certain
unlisted companies."" Congress subsequently adopted these proposals."
Borak vindicated, if vindication was necessary, Judge Friendly's role as a
prophet of things to come.
* This Article is based on a lecture delivered to the Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal
Education on March 7, 1969, and to the Open Meeting of the Committee on Federal Regulation
of Securities of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Asso-
ciation held in connection with its annual meeting in Dallas, Texas, on August 10, 1969.
** Ph.B., J.D., University of Chicago. Attorney at Law, Chicago, Illinois. Of Counsel for the
plaintiff in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak.
1 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383,
412-14 (1964).
'Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
441 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
' Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
629 U.S.C. S 185(c) (1965).
'Friendly, supra note 2, at 413.
8 317 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1963).
'Friendly, supra note 2, at 414 n.152.
1078 Stat. 565 (1964), amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 3, 12, 14, 15, 20, 23,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78(c), (1), (n), (o), (t),.(w) (1963). These amendments were adopted after the
United States Supreme Court decision in Borah.
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During the twenty-year period prior to Borak, federal courts in a sub-
stantial number of cases had implied private rights of action under sec-
tions 6 (b), 7 (c), 10 (b), 14 (a), and 29 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.11 Borak strongly endorsed and articulated the case for the im-
plied cause of action, and the unanimity of the Court left no doubt as to
the direction lower courts were to go. Five years have gone by since
Borak was decided by the Supreme Court."2 The significance of this deci-
sion in the development of securities law, and particularly in the articula-
tion of judicial remedies for securities frauds, is the broad proposition to
which this Article is addressed.
I. J. I. CASE v. BORAK
To understand the impact of Borak on the development of securities law
it is important to view, as background, the petition and holding in this
case. Plaintiff's complaint, brought as a representative class action in fed-
eral district court, has two counts. The first count, based on diversity of
jurisdiction, charges violation of Wisconsin law, particularly the depriva-
tion of pre-emptive rights of shareholders and directors' breach of duty
'115 U.S.C. §§ 78(f), (g), (i), (n), (cc) (1964). Section 6(b) of the 1934 Act provides
among other matters that the rules of a registered exchange must provide for discipline of mem-
bers for willful violation of the Act or regulations issued thereunder, or for conduct in violation
of equitable principles of trade. Section 7(c) of the 1934 Act prohibits, among other acts, "any
member of a national securities exchange . . . directly or indirectly to extend or maintain
credit or arrange for the extension or maintenance of credit to or for any customer" in contra-
vention of rules and regulations promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board. Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate "such rules and regu-
lations . . . as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act regulates the solicitation of proxies and authorized rule 14a-9
which ultimately became the basis for the Borah. decision. Section 29(b), subject to certain limi-
tations, makes contracts in violation of the 1934 Act or regulations issued thereunder, void.
For decisions under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, see Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp.,
288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961); Central Foundry Co. v. Gondelman, 166 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y.
1958); Rosen v. Alleghany Corp., 133 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Horwitz v. Balaban, 112
F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Tate v. Sonotone, 5 S.E.C. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). See also Mack
v Mishkin, 172 F. Supp. 885, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Textron v. American Woolen Co., 122 F.
Supp. 305, 308 (D. Mass. 1954). And see Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 231 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd on other grounds, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961), and Phillips v. United Corp., $ S.E.C. 445
(S.D.N.Y. 1947), where violations of the same proxy rules, made applicable by other provisions
of the federal securities laws, were involved.
As to § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, see Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Matheson
v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1960); Hooper v. Mountain
States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1960); Reed v. Riddle
Airlines, 266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Fratt
v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d
Cir. 1951); Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1949); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
As to other sections of the 1934 Act, see Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) (§ 6(b)); Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass.
1949) (§ 7(c)); Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (§ 29(b)).
12377 U.S. 426 (1964), aff'g Borak v. J.1. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1963). Charac-
terized as a landmark decision, the case has been cited countless times by federal district courts
and courts of appeal and the Supreme Court. For law review discussions of the case, see Comment,
Private Rights from Federal Statutes: Toward a Rational Use of Borak, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 454
(1968); Comment, Private Rights and Federal Remedies: Herein of J.I. Case v. Borak, 12
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1150 (1965); Note, Violations of Proxy Rules: Private Right of Action: Retro-
spective Relief: I.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1336 (1964);
50 CORN. L.Q. 370 (1965); 78 HARv. L. REV. 296 (1964). Trial on the merits of the remanded
case began in June 1969, and is still in progress. Under these circumstances the merits of the case
are not discussed herein.
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to shareholders. The second count charges violations of the federal proxy
rules" promulgated under sections 14 (a) 1 and 10 (b) " of the Securities
Exchange Act, based on section 27 jurisdiction.'" Upon plaintiff's refusal to
provide security-for-costs previously ordered on the basis that the first
count stated a derivative and not a representative action, and that accord-
ingly the Wisconsin security-for-cost statute was applicable, this count was
dismissed by the trial court. 7 Relying on Dann v. Studebaker" the court
held as to the second count that its jurisdiction was limited to declaratory
relief and that if plaintiff succeeded in securing declaratory judgment, fur-
ther relief would await action in the Wisconsin state courts. It also held
that the claim based on section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act was
outside the scope of the order permitting plaintiff to file an amended
pleading. "
The Seventh Circuit reversed," holding that: (1) count I stated a rep-
resentative cause of action for redress of rights as individual Case stock-
holders; (2) Dann v. Studebaker was wrong and that in an implied cause
of action the court could grant all necessary relief, both prospective and
retrospective; (3) the Wisconsin security-for-cost statute was inapplicable
to federally based claims; and (4) that the section 10(b) claim had no
application to the facts alleged in the complaint.
Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court as to one
question only: Whether section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act au-
thorizes a federal cause of action for rescission or damages to a corporate
stockholder where a consummated merger was authorized pursuant to the
"aSEC Reg. 14A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to -7 (1968).
1415 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964):
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of any national securities
exchange or otherwise to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any
proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security . . . registered on any
national securities exchange in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
'515 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
1615 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964):
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits
in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder ....
1
7
WIs. STAT. § 180.405 (1957) provides in part:
(4) In any action brought in the right of any foreign or domestic corporation by
the holder or holders of less than 3 percent of any class of shares issued and outstand-
ing, the defendants shall be entitled on application to the court to require the
plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security for the reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees.
"8288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961).
" The court also entertained doubt as to whether a § 10(b) action would lie.
20317 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1963). The case was taken as an interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (1966).
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use of a proxy statement allegedly containing false and misleading state-
ments in violation of section 14 (a) of the Act? The Supreme Court hold-
ing in Borak may be briefly summarized in three points. First, a private
cause of action will be implied from a violation of duties imposed by the
Securities Exchange Act. Second, a private cause of action may be brought
either as a derivative or representative action on behalf of shareholders
(Howard v. Furst"' was silently but definitely overruled). Third, and most
important to this Article, federal courts may grant whatever relief is nec-
essary under the circumstances, including recission and damages, to effect
the purposes of the Act (Dann v. Studebaker was expressly overruled').
With relation to the scope of relief which federal courts could grant, the
Supreme Court stated that:
[U]nder the circumstances here it is the duty of the courts to be alert to
provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional
purpose.
[T]he overriding federal law applicable here would, where the facts required,
control the appropriateness of redress despite the provisions of state corpora-
tion law for it 'is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law
where federal rights are concerned' Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 457 (1957).24
II. APPLICATIONS OF BORAK
Standing To Sue in a Borak-Type Action. When referring to a Borak-type
case, as that term is now used, we mean a private cause of action to en-
force the proxy rules and regulations issued under section 14 (a) of the
Securities Exchange Act. While Borak dealt only with section 14(a), the
logic of that decision by a unanimous Court makes clear that a private
cause of action exists under other sections of the Act such as 6 (b), 7 (c),
10(b), and 29(b).5 The Borak case takes on added significance when
read in conjunction with the Supreme Court's recent decision in the Na-
tional Securities case." This case holds that the fraudulent purchase and
sale prohibitions of section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act also ap-
ply to stock exchanged in a merger and that false and misleading proxy
statements may constitute a violation of the provisions of section 10(b).
Thus, practically speaking, cases involving mergers normally brought under
section 14 (a) may also be brought under section 10 (b).
The National Securities decision is of particular significance with relation
to remedies since most discussion by courts of the scope of relief in private
causes of action has been in cases involving section 10 (b). The Court ex-
pressly left open the question of whether there was a private cause of
action for a 10 (b) violation, although every court of appeals in the coun-
2' 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956).
22 377 U.S. at 434.
23 1d. at 433.
14 1d. at 434.
2 See note 11 supra.
"6SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
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try has ruled that such a remedy does exist." The rationale of Borak strong-
ly indicates that when this issue is squarely presented to the Supreme
Court there will be a holding that there is a private cause of action for a
violation of section 10 (b)."s
The full scope of the Borak case may be obscured by the fact that the
plaintiff in the case was a minority shareholder. Standing to assert a Borak
right of action is not limited to minority shareholders. It makes no differ-
ence who is soliciting or receiving proxies if the end result is a misinformed
or uninformed vote by security holders. Interference or frustration of
suffrage may involve not only a direct infringement of the individual
rights of the shareholder, but also may harm a corporation whose future
may be determined by such a vote. The implied private cause of action
belongs both to corporations and to individuals whose proxies are illegally
solicited. The right thus extends to dissident or insurgent security holders,
to management through direct corporate action as distinguished from
derivative actions," and to suits by one shareholder group against another."0
Elements and Defenses of a Borak-Type Action. What are the elements of
a Borak-type action?" Regarding two elements there is no conflict of opin-
ion: There must first be a showing that the proxy solicitations were sub-
ject to section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, and second, there
must be a showing of infringement of suffrage rights with relation to the
transaction of materials (the inclusion of materially misleading statements
or omission of materially correct statements) in violation of the proxy
rules. A third element, about which there has recently developed a signifi-
cant split of judicial opinion, is that the misleading proxy materials must
have played a significant or causal role in the transaction. In Bora. this
question was summarily resolved by the Court's statement that the "causal
relationship of the proxy material and the merger are questions of fact
to be resolved at the trial.""
In general, this element of causation has been the least clearly delineated
by the courts. In Laurenzano v. Einbender" the test laid down was whether
the proxy materials have a transactional function and are not randomly
present in the context of the transaction. Expressed in the simplest terms,
there must be a showing that "but for" the voting of the proxies secured by
the misleading statement the transaction would not have been approved."4
" Cases are collected in Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State
of Mind in Rule lob-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423, 431 n.46 (1968).
"8 In this opinion I am supported by Professor Ruder, id. at 432.
"Studebaker v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1965); Goodrich Rubber Co. v. N.W.
Indus., 406 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1969); Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Prod. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173
(W.D. Mich. 1966).
"°Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 405 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
"See Lockwood, Corporate Acquisitions and Actions Under Sections 10(b) and 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 Bus. LAw. 365 (1968).
"2 377 U.S. at 431.
3"264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
" For a definitive treatment of cases involving the "causal connection" requirement, see L.
Loss, SEcuRITIEs REGULATnON 2433-39 (Supp. 1969). For considered treatment of causation in
a § 10(b) case, see Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Even where defend-
ants controlled more than a majority of voting stock the proxies may well have a'transactional func-
tion, since an unfavorable vote from minority stockholders might have caused defendants to re-
1969]
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In Mills v. Electric Autolite Co.,35 a recent decision by the Seventh Circuit,
the court ruled that notwithstanding its determination that the proxy ma-
terials were misleading in omitting a material fact, no relief could be given
the plaintiff until the defendants were first given an opportunity to prove
the merger was fair and equitable and to satisfy the court by a preponder-
ance of probabilities that the merger would have received a sufficient vote
even if the proxy statement had not been misleading. Should the defend-
ants successfully carry that burden, no relief could be given plaintiff.'
The soundness of the Autolite decision is subject to serious question.
The court focused its decision upon the question of whether the mislead-
ing statement and material omission caused the submission of sufficient
proxies. The court recognized that this test closely parallels the common
law fraud requirement of reliance on the representation and therefore
stated: "Reliance by thousands of individuals, as here, can scarcely be in-
quired into.""7 Faced with the dilemma of applying a representation-and-
reliance test the Seventh Circuit substituted as the appropriate test-
whether or not a court could hold "by a preponderance of probabilities,
that the merger would have received a sufficient vote even if the proxy
statement had not been misleading in the respect found." 8 Such a deter-
mination would be made after receiving evidence from the defendants go-
ing to the fairness or merits of the terms of the merger. In effect, under
Autolite the controlling factor becomes the fairness of the plan of merger.
Presumably if the court finds that the plan is fair, it could then conclude
that there is a greater probability that the shareholders would have voted
favorably for the plan even if the proxy statement had made all material
disclosures. Fairness of the plan, if established, becomes an absolute defense,
even if it is conceded that the proxy statement violates section 14 and the
proxy rules.
The injection of the fairness of a plan of merger as a measure of reliance
or as a causal factor masks an important issue. That issue is whether there
is a remedy for violation of the proxy rules even if the plan of merger is
fair. Where corporate suffrage rights are violated, Borak contemplates some
remedy. To give a wrongdoer who has obtained proxies by misleading state-
ments another opportunity to validate a vote by showing that the merger
was fair and equitable and to argue that by a "preponderance of probabili-
ties" the merger would have received a sufficient vote even if the proxy
statement was not misleading, effectively negates any remedy. In develop-
ing a federal common law in this field, courts must derive the essence there-
of from statutes or clearly expressed legislative purpose. But nothing in the
Securities Exchange Act, its history, or its purpose supports the Autolite
consider their merger plans. Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1966);
Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 92,458 (7th Cir. Aug. 13,
1969). See also Weber v. Bartle, 272 F. Supp. 201, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Contra, Barnett v.
Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"5403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 394 U.S. 971 (1969).
s8 4 0 3 F.2d at 436.
" Id. at 436 n.10.
38 1d. at 436.
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holding. The decision in fact runs counter to the congressional purpose
to protect investors in their corporate suffrage rights.
The claimed "fairness of the plan of merger" was rejected as a defense
in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc." The proxy statement in that case justi-
fied the exchange of stock on comparative market values of the securities
of the merging company when in fact the liquidating value of the assets
of the acquired company would have required that a substantially higher
price be paid to the shareholders of the acquired company. The district
court said:
The plaintiffs in this case were prevented from exercising their right to
decide whether to gamble and speculate upon the profits to be received from
the sale of the remaining properties and to diversify the proceeds ....
The purpose of § 14(a) was to prevent such frustration of stockholders
(H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 14). The exercise of this right
cannot be defeated by the mere promulgation of a fair plan in a merger pro-
ceeding. Nor can the remedy of restitution be defeated by such a defense.'
The court in Gamble-Skogmo discussed at length the element of reliance
as causation in a Borak-type case. It concluded that to require stockholders
by direct proof to establish sufficient reliance to validate a causal connec-
tion, would be to impose a prohibitive burden of proof in a publicly held
corporation. The court placed the burden on the defendant to show
absence of "either reliance or causation on the part of the stockholders
voting for the merger."' It concluded that causation may be inferred from
the totality of the circumstances.
From its opinion, it seems that the Autolite court was concerned about
the remedy-a fear that judgment for plaintiff would have resulted in
setting aside the merger, even though the merger might have been in the
best interest of the shareholders. I submit that there was another alternative
to the very restrictive, and I believe unsound, precondition to relief laid
down in Autolite. That alternative would have been to await determination
by the trial court as to the remedy and to review that determination in the
light of its findings. The trial court is not compelled to order recission or
dissolution-some remedies serving a deterrence objective can be shaped
by the trial court. For example, the Gamble-Skogmo court, after trial, or-
dered an accounting and restitution.'
Remedies in Borak-Type Cases-General Considerations. What are the
remedies available in a Borak-type case, assuming plaintiff is able to estab-
lish the elements of a cause of action? Perhaps it would serve some purpose
to view the matter of remedies in its broadest terms.
'CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,367 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1969).4 0 Id. at 97,750.
41 Id. at 97,748.
42 Id. at 97,753. The decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Eastside Church of
Christ v. National Plan, Inc., 391 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1968), is also of interest. In that case the
defendant failed to register in compliance with section 15(a) (1) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. The court held the transaction could be voided under § 29(b), that the plaintiffs need
only show they were "in the class of persons whose interest the Act was designed to protect."
They were not required to show harm suffered by failure to register. Id. at 362.
1969]
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Borak and National Securities in substance direct the federal courts, in
the handling of private causes of action, to carry out the broad objectives
of security statutes. The trend of decisions since Borak indicates that the
courts will insist on standards of conduct consistent with the objectives of
the statutes, and are prepared to encourage strong remedies to foreclose
activities which defeat or frustrate these objectives. When I speak of courts,
I am neither referring to all judges nor to all decisions. Although I know
of no statistical study of outcomes of securities cases, I suspect a box-score
would favor the defendant.' What I do refer to is the dominant trend of
court decisions. The critics of this trend of opinions have a different basic
approach. They look at the body of federal regulation and point to a pat-
tern of regulation derived from the express language of the statutes.
They claim that, taken as a whole, the remedies therein specified should be
adequate, and that in any event Congress did not intend to go further."
On the other hand, significant decisions of the courts place emphasis on the
broad purpose of the relevant statutes-the protection of investors. It is
that stated purpose which provides the rationale for Borak and other land-
mark decisions.
The difference in approach may be explained to some extent by the fact
that the cases that come before the courts frequently are shockers, some-
times involving blatant and raw kinds of fraud. If one does nothing more
than read the Wall Street journal regularly he cannot help but be im-
pressed by the substantial number of cases involving both small and large
corporations and individuals of wealth and social position involved in ques-
tionable conduct. I do not mean to downgrade the great majority of secur-
ities traders who adhere to ethical standards. But the securities markets
are still markets of speculation. They still hold out prospects for great
profits made in a short time. Human nature being what it is, the urge to
get rich quick or to enhance one's riches in a hurry, is an important factor.
The ruthless, no-holds-barred attitude is best exemplified by the tactics
used in the recent rash of take-over attempts, both successful and unsuc-
cessful. The standards of conduct which have been and are likely to be
developed by the courts will continue to be at variance with the mores
of the market place. Ostensibly these standards will be derived from the
statutes. They will continue to reflect the concern for the consequences or
lack of restraint in securities transactions, particularly during this period
of national history when so many millions of Americans have invested in
securities. My reason for dwelling on court attitudes is my conviction that
the remedies developed by the courts for violation of judicially established
standards of conduct will reflect these attitudes.
' For box-score on 10b-5 cases, see Comment, Rule lOb-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases:
Who Must Deceive Whom?, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 477, 495-98 (1968).
"4Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340 (1966); Ruder, Texas Gulf
Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule I0b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases,
63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423 (1968); Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Cor-
porations by Implication Through Rule 10-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 185 (1964).
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Securities Exchange Act Limitations in Private Causes of Action. There are
five sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which provide for
remedies in private causes of action: sections 9(e),' 16(b)," 18(a) , 4
28 (a), 4' and 29(b)." The question arises as to whether in implied causes
of actions, such as Borak-type cases, the remedies are limited to those spe-
cified in the 1934 Act. The problem comes into better focus by considering
the court decisions of section 10 (b) cases which deny or give effect to the
section 28 (a) limitation on recovery to actual damages." The most recent
case in this regard is Green v. Wolf Corp.51 There the Second Circuit sus-
tained a district court ruling striking from a section 10(b) complaint a
claim for punitive damages. The court recognized that punitive damages
are permitted under the 1933 Securities Act, but stated that the 1933 Act
did not contain language similar to section 28 (a) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act. The Second Circuit's principal rationale was that punitive
damages can be justified only as retribution or as a deterrent measure, but
that punitive damages are not needed as a deterrent in section 10 (b) cases
since liability for actual damages may be very substantial. The purpose of
retribution would not be served by imposing punitive damages against a
publicly held corporation, then, because a heavy burden would fall on all
stockholders.
The decisions against the imposition of punitive damages are difficult to
reconcile with decisions allowing a rescissional measure of damages which
may return to plaintiff not only his original investment but also a sub-
stantial windfall. Nor can these decisions be reconciled with the Borak and
National Securities holdings that federal courts have broad discretion in
shaping the relief necessary and can specifically grant rescission-a remedy
not specified in any of the provisions of the 1934 Act.
4* 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1964) provides that a willful violator of prohibitions against manipu-
lation of securities prices is liable to any purchaser or seller of such affected securities; security
for costs is provided; and the time span for enforcing liability is within one year after discovery
of facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation.
46 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964) provides that the issuer of stock, or any owner of security of
issue (if issuer fails to bring suit within 60 days after request) may sue for short-swing profits
of insider; statute of limitations commences two years after the date the profit was realized.
47 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1964) provides a cause of action for damages accruing to any person
relying on a false and misleading application, report, or document or any undertaking in a regis-
tration statement, for purchases or sales of securities; security for costs is provided, and the statute
of limitations is the same here as for § 9(e).
48 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964) provides in part:
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and
all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person
permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall
recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in
excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of.
49 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1964) provides that contracts made in violation of the 1934 Act are
void under certain circumstances.
5
"Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Kohler v. Kohler,
208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963) (§ 28(a) limits re-
covery to actual damages and bars punitive damages). Contra, Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718,
747-48 (8th Cir. 1967); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786-87 (1st Cir. 1965); Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 444-45 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F.
Supp. 128 (D. Md. 1968) (rescissional damages are not barred by § 28(a)).
51 CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. 5 92,321 (2d Cir. Dec. 9, 1968).
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III. THE NATURE OF AVAILABLE REMEDIES
IN PRIVATE ACTIONS
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is silent as to remedies in private
actions brought under sections 14(a) and 10(b). Courts have applied a
substantial battery of remedies which lend themselves to discussion in two
categories-premerger and postmerger.
Premerger Remedies. The injunctive remedy has been used extensively by
the courts as a way of granting therapeutic relief. The courts have freely
granted injunctions prior to consummation of the transaction for a variety
of purposes: to postpone shareholder meetings," to require supplementation
or correction of proxy materials with reservation of jurisdiction to oversee
solicitation of proxies," to enjoin a state court action and restrain the use
of stockholders' authorizations to obtain inspection of stockholder's list
where obtained without compliance with the proxy rules, " and to enjoin
use of proxies obtained by false or misleading materials." Injunctive relief
before a merger is a feasible remedy when the plaintiff is a corporation or
a substantial group of shareholders. In the typical suit by a minority share-
holder, the requirement of posting bond exposes the shareholder to finan-
cial risk most minority shareholders cannot assume. Hence, in most of these
cases no such injunctive relief is sought. Here is an area for judicial innova-
tion. In the interest of effective justice, premerger relief should be en-
couraged. Early termination of litigation clearly benefits the corporations
involved, their shareholders, and overburdened courts. The mandate of
Borak to devise effective relief would justify a court, satisfied that a suffi-
cient showing has been made to warrant the issuance of a preliminary in-
junction, in requiring only a nominal bond.
Postmerger or Retrospective Relief. As stated before, most discussion con-
cerning remedies has occurred in section 10(b) cases. Within these deci-
sions, most courts have held that a rescission or return to the status quo
ante would be ordered when the defendant has not disposed of the securi-
ties, or as an alternative courts have allowed a rescissional measure of dam-
ages, including accretions to value." National Securities established the ap-
propriateness of rescission as a remedy. 7 Recently great anxiety has been
expressed concerning the great potential liability for damages in non-
privity situations." This anxiety has led to suggestions that the remedy
5
aHenwood v. SEC, 298 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814 (1962); Studebaker
Corp. v. Allied Prods., 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Il. 1964).
"3Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Prods., 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
"Studebaker v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 414 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Willough-
by v. Port, 182 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y.), modified and aff'd, 277 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960);
SEC v. May, 134 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1956).
"8As stated in Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965), "It is more appropriate to
give the defrauded party the benefit of windfalls than to let the fraudulent party keep them."
Id. at 786, cited with approval in Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 747 (8th Cir. 1967).
57 See note 26 supra, and accompanying text.
"8SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864-69 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., con-
curring); Knauss, Disclosure Requirements--Changing Concepts of Liability, 24 Bus. LAW. 43,
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be severely limited in such cases. I do not suggest that this anxiety is mis-
placed, but I think it does not take into account the broad discretion which
lies in the trial courts, and in general the good judgment which may be
anticipated on the part of our trial court judges. I would suggest that it is
idle to attempt to formulate, in the abstract, restrictive principles for such
cases. If restrictions are developed, they should be developed on a case-by-
case basis. In the end, I have confidence in the outcome of this traditional
process.
One conclusion that emerges from my review of section 14(a) cases,
particularly concerning mergers or acquisitions, is that generalizations
concerning retrospective relief do not provide much help, and reported
decisions throw little light on the subject. The bulk of cases are usually
settled after the trial court holds that the complaint states a cause of action
and after some discovery has occurred. The settlements which have been
made employ a variety of remedies which are somewhat suggestive. If any
generalization can be made, I think it fair to say that the broad objective
of the plaintiff is to secure a return to the status quo ante or, if this is not
possible, that the corporation or the class of shareholders represented be
made whole again. Since the relief must be custom-made to meet the ne-
cessities of the case, the array of remedies available include declaratory
judgment, damages, accounting, restitution, rescission, mandatory and pro-
hibitory injunctive relief.
A discussion of some illustrative situations may be of some help in
analyzing the nature of available remedies. First, let us consider the case
of self-dealing by officers or directors, such as the sale of corporate stock
below actual value to directors or the grant of stock options or excessively
high salaries in employment contracts made as a part of a merger plan.
The relief in this case does not require that the merger be set aside, and
the court is therefore presented with alternatives which do not involve
drastic consequences. The most direct remedy in the case of self-dealing
is an injunctive order which would direct cancellation of either the stock
issued or the stock options and award damages for any benefits received
thereunder in excess of the amounts paid for such stock or stock options.
In the case of an employment contract, the terms of the contract can be
voided or by injunctive order the court can direct that the terms of the
contract be changed to eliminate the self-serving aspects.
A more difficult problem is presented when the securities of the corpora-
tion acquired in a merger or sale of assets have been grossly overpriced or
the shareholders of the acquired company have been grossly underpaid. In
this case the most effective remedy would be rescission or return to the
status quo ante. Under Borak and the National Securities case, rescission
can be ordered if the court finds that course of action desirable, necessary,
and otherwise lawful. But there are, of course, practical problems in res-
cission. The complexities of securities litigation and the fact that they are
56-61 (1968) (suggesting alternative remedies); Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for
the Development of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule lOb-5, 65 COLUM. L. RE. 1361
(1965); Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule
lob-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. Ruv. 423 (1968).
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thoroughly defended may result in a trial of the issues years after the
consummation of the merger. For example, the decision in Borak was handed
down more than seven years after the merger and the remanded case is still
pending; the National Securities case was decided three and one-half years
after the merger and still has to be tried on remand. Restoring the status
quo ante after such a lapse of time may be an impossible task since the
acquired company has lost its identity, its employees, its good will, and
for all practical purposes it no longer exists.
Another situation which arises in section 14(a) cases involves the sale
of corporate assets for inadequate consideration to a potentially insurgent
group, or when an asset is purchased from an insurgent group at an exces-
sive price, and the underlying objective of such sale or purchase is to main-
tain management control. In such a case rescission of the transaction can be
ordered without jeopardizing the interests of the shareholders. If rescission
is not possible because the assets have been sold, the court can assess damages
on a rescissionary basis against both the insiders and the insurgent group
in order that such damages be paid to the corporation. The court will not
order rescission, and should not order rescission, where the impact will be
adverse to the interest of the shareholders. It is highly unlikely that the
deterrent effect of rescission will take precedence in a court's mind over
the economic interest of all shareholders, including those represented by the
plaintiff.
There are, however, alternatives to a rescission. In Gamble-Skogmo the
court, concluding that the shareholders of the acquired corporation were
underpaid for their shares, ordered an accounting and restitution. It held
that the restitutional basis of recovery is the value of the property at the
time the sale was consummated or a higher value at a subsequent time if
the value of the property has thereafter fluctuated or additions have been
made thereto."
Where an excessive price is paid and the interests of the shareholders in
the acquiring company have been accordingly diluted, the court can meet
this situation by an injunctive order directing that additional shares be
issued to the shareholders of the acquiring company. A variety of devices
of a similar character are available and have been used in settlement cases.
A second alternative is an award of damages against the directors or
insiders responsible for the fraud, payable to the corporation in derivative
cases or to the defrauded class of shareholders in representative cases.
My final illustrative situation is the sale of a controlling interest as part
of a merger plan when the merger serves no corporate purpose and the
primary purpose is to enable the controlling shareholder to sell his stock on
an over-priced basis to the acquiring corporation. Here, possible remedies
include (1) rescission, (2) award of damages in favor of the minority
shareholders of the acquired corporation, or (3) an award of damages in
favor of the surviving corporation equal to the difference between the
price paid the controlling shareholders and that paid to other shareholders,
aaCCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,367, at 97,750 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1969).
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presumably offsetting to some extent the dilution of the interests of the
minority shareholders of the acquired corporation. In the latter case, the
award of damages should be coupled with an injunction directing the is-
suance of additional stock to the minority shareholders of the acquired cor-
poration to compensate for the dilution of their interest in the merged
corporation. In all cases where wrongdoing has been shown to have been
established the court may, in addition to the remedies I have mentioned,
order the wrongdoers to pay the cost of the litigation, including attorney's
fees.
IV. CONCLUSION
At this stage in the development of the private cause of action, except
for the measure of damages in section 10 (b) cases and the clear-cut deci-
sions of the Supreme Court that rescission may be an appropriate remedy,
there is not a great deal of decisional material from which one can gen-
eralize a well-defined set of principles applicable to the shaping of relief
in Borak-type cases. The mandate of the Supreme Court is, however, in-
disputable. It is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies
as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose. In time, the
ingenuity of judges and lawyers will provide the grist for the scholars' mills.
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